The Impact of Lovelace v. Ontario on Section 15 of the Charter by Sterling, Lori




Volume 14 (2001) Article 4
The Impact of Lovelace v. Ontario on Section 15 of
the Charter
Lori Sterling
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Sterling, Lori. "The Impact of Lovelace v. Ontario on Section 15 of the Charter." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual




THE IMPACT OF LOVELACE V. 






On June 20, 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in 
Lovelace v. Ontario (the Lovelace case).1
 
This was the first case to reach the 
Supreme Court of Canada that focused on section 15(2) of the Charter.2 Section 
15(2) states:  
 
Subsection [15](1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object 
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those 
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability. 
 
The facts of this case were that the government had reached an agreement with 
bands under the Indian Act3 to provide a licence for a commercial casino, with the 
net profits being distributed amongst all bands in Ontario. After three years of 
negotiations between the Chiefs of Ontario, who represented the bands, and the 
government of Ontario, the casino was constructed on a reserve near Orillia and 
was called Casino Rama. Just before the opening of Casino Rama, however, 
several Métis and non-status Indian groups and communities brought a legal 
_______________________________________________________________ 
* The author acted as counsel for the respondent Ontario. An earlier version of this paper is to 
be published in the LSUC 2000 Charter lectures. The views expressed herein are those of the author 
alone and do not represent the position of the government of Ontario. This paper was originally presented 
at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the 
Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional Development Program at Osgoode 
Hall Law School. 
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  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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  R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 




challenge alleging that their exclusion from the project violated their right to equal 
treatment under section 15(1) of the Charter. 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the Casino Rama project on 
the basis that it did not violate section 15(1) of the Charter. In its decision, the 
Supreme Court of Canada had to grapple with complex questions such as the 
relationship between section 15(1) and (2), and the difference between an 
ameliorative program that targets a small group of disadvantaged beneficiaries 
(“targeted programs”) and a program that is generally available (“universal 
programs”). The Court also had to resolve the vexing question of what role is left 
for section 1 of the Charter in the context of a challenge to a section 15(2) 
ameliorative program. Further, the Court had to analyze the differences between 
aboriginal groups and make findings on whether the Casino Rama project perpetuated 
the stereotyping of Métis and non-status Indians. 
The purpose of this paper is to canvass the different approaches to section 15(2) of 
the Charter that were open to the Supreme Court of Canada to adopt in the Lovelace 
case and to analyze the particular approach the Court ultimately chose. In particular, 
it is suggested that while the Court refused to acknowledge that it was amending the 
section 15(1) test for targeted programs, it did, in fact, do so by modifying the 
“contextual factors” which are considered in the assessment of discrimination. The 
result is a test for affirmative action programs which purports to simply apply the pre-
existing section 15(1) jurisprudence but, in reality, modifies it so that such programs 
are more likely to withstand a constitutional challenge.  
II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SECTION 15(2) 
There were several different approaches open to the Court to adopt when 
deciding whether an ameliorative, targeted program violates the equality rights of 
an excluded group. Not all of these approaches, however, were put to the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Lovelace case, and there exists a myriad of other options 
that are not discussed in this paper.4
  
One option not recommended to the Supreme Court of Canada by any of the 
parties but that was ultimately discussed by the Court is the so-called “rationality 
approach.” This approach is found in the lower court jurisprudence and suggests 
that it is appropriate to modify the standard section 15(1) test by incorporating a 
review of the “rationality” of the affirmative action program. An early example of 
this rationality approach is found in Apsit v. Manitoba Human Rights 
_______________________________________________________________ 
4  Other approaches not canvassed in this paper include: Subjective Intent Analysis: see Ontario 
Human Rights Commission v. Ontario (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 387, at 393-94 (C.A.); Subjective Purpose 
and Ancillary Features Assessment: see Pierce, “A Progressive Interpretation of Subsection 15(2) of the 
Charter” (1993), 57 Sask. L. Rev. 263; Objective Purpose Analysis: see Penner v. Danbrook, [1992] 4 
W.W.R. 385, at 389-90 (Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1993] 1 S.C.R. viii. 




Commission.5 In this case, the Manitoba Queen’s Bench struck down a program 
that gave native persons an advantage in growing wild rice. The Court struck down 
the program on the basis that native persons already had an advantage in this area 
and what they really needed was help with other skills. It is suggested that this 
decision sets too high a standard for affirmative action programs. Why not assist 
native persons in areas that are related to their tradition and culture and where they 
have prior experience? 
The main advantage of the rationality approach is that it allows excluded groups 
the opportunity to bring a challenge and receive an explanation as to why the 
program was created. One criticism of this approach, however, is that it may render 
the section 1 test redundant. How could a program that has been found not to be 
rational then meet the section 1 test?  
A variation on this approach is found in R. v. Willocks.6 This case dealt with a 
program to assist aboriginal persons in the justice system by offering them a 
“diversion” program for certain offences. The program was challenged by a 
Jamaican accused who was not eligible for diversion. Watt J., in obiter, discussed 
the ambit of section 15(2) and adopted a test which permitted affirmative programs 
to pass constitutional muster unless there was “gross unfairness.” “Gross 
unfairness” was intended to permit a higher degree of deference toward such 
programs than one of rationality. He stated: 
 
In any program which is designed to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged 
group, others will be “disadvantaged” as a result of their non-eligibility for 
participation. Section 15(2) acknowledges as much. What must be avoided is gross 
unfairness to others. The Charter does not ask, in my respectful view, that an 
affirmative action program within s. 15(2), must address at once all individuals or 
groups who suffer similar disadvantage. There must be some room left to establish and 
give effect to priorities amongst disadvantaged groups, provided there is no gross 
unfairness.7 
 
A second approach to section 15(2) was articulated by the appellants in the 
Lovelace case8 and was supported by a native women’s group, the Native 
Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC), which had intervened in this case. The 
appellants had argued that section 15(2) was only intended to prevent challenges 
_______________________________________________________________ 
5
 [1988] 1 W.W.R. 629 (Man. Q.B.). See for criticism of this approach, Vizkelety, 
“Affirmative Action, Equality and the Courts: Comparing Action Travail des Femmes v. CN and Apsit 
and the Manitoba Rice Farmers Association v. The Manitoba Human Rights Commission” (1990), 4 
C.J.W.L. 287. 
6
  (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 552 (Gen. Div.). 
7  Id., at 571. 
8  See Pothier, “Charter Challenges to Underinclusive Legislation: The Complexities of Sins of 
Omission” (1993), Queen’s L.J. 261, for further discussion of this approach. 




from advantaged groups. It therefore operated as a complete bar to the bringing of 
a section15 challenge by an advantaged group to an affirmative action program. For 
excluded disadvantaged groups, however, section 15(2) had no relevance whatsoever. In 
other words, where an excluded disadvantaged group demonstrated a violation of 
section 15(1), the onus then shifted to the government to justify the programs under 
section 1 of the Charter.9 Neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court of Canada 
accepted this approach. 
The appellant’s approach is problematic for several reasons. It is at odds with 
the plain language of section 15(2), which does not draw any distinction based on 
who the potential challenger is. As well, it ignores section 15(2) except in 
challenges from a limited class of potential applicants: advantaged persons.  
A serious problem with this approach is that it could dissuade governments and 
community-based groups from jointly developing ameliorative programs, 
especially those that involve incremental or experimental phases. The existence of 
a minority legal aid clinic may be due to the fact that a particular community hall 
was rent-free and that student lawyers were willing to staff the clinic rather than 
because of a survey done of all minority groups to see which one was most needy 
or a review of the facilities that were available in different communities. Simply 
stated, the appellant’s approach may not provide governments with sufficient 
encouragement to develop affirmative action programs as a means to achieve 
equality, because a program will readily be open to challenge. The Court of Appeal 
in Lovelace explained why it is important to grant governments some leeway for 
affirmative action programs, as follows: 
 
Governments have no constitutional obligation to remedy all conditions of 
disadvantage in our society. If government affirmative action programs can be too 
readily challenged because, for example, they do not go far enough in remedying 
disadvantage, governments will be discouraged from initiating such programs. 
Governments should be able to establish special programs under section 15(2) that 
distinguish between or even within groups protected under section 15(1).10 
 
If a rigorous section 1 analysis were required for any of these programs to 
survive then the government and the beneficiaries might be less inclined to develop 
such programs.  
Finally, this approach raises the spectre of further litigation over the meaning of an 
“advantaged” group. It fails to recognize that the concept of advantage is complex 
because it is both relative and contextual. Under this approach, a program which 
_______________________________________________________________ 
9
  This approach appears to be motivated by a concern that governments might play favourites 
with disadvantaged groups, and highlights a distrust of affirmative action programs, even among some 
equality-seeking groups. 
10 
 Lovelace v. Ontario (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 735, at 755 (C.A.). 




provides a hospice for AIDS patients could be challenged by a group composed of 
Alzheimer’s patients. How is a court to determine which group is more 
disadvantaged? 
A third approach to section 15(2), which was adopted by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Lovelace but rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, focused on the 
purposes of the program. Specifically, the Court of Appeal found that where a 
program, on objective grounds, has as its purpose the provision of a benefit or 
assistance to a disadvantaged group, there is no violation of section 15(1) as long 
as the excluded group does not fall within the purposes of the program. In contrast, 
where an excluded disadvantaged group does fall within the purposes of a program 
then it is open to that group to argue that the program violates section 15(1) of the 
Charter.  
This approach was consistent with the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Ontario11 and the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs.12 In Gibbs, 
the Court examined an employer’s disability plan and held that it was intended to 
cover both mental and physical disabilities. Under the plan, however, mental 
disabilities were subject to time-limited coverage whereas physical disabilities 
were not so limited. The Court held that the plan violated the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Act on the basis that it inappropriately excluded a group on the 
prohibited ground of mental disability even though that group fell within the general 
purposes of the program. The Court distinguished this type of program from a more 
limited one intended to provide hand insurance for piano teachers on the basis that the 
purpose of this latter type of program was not a general employment disability 
program. 
Perhaps the most elaborate application of this approach to section 15(2) is found 
in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Lovelace. The Court in that case 
reviewed the entire evidentiary record and concluded that the purpose of the 
Casino Rama was to provide Indian bands with the opportunity for economic 
development through a casino operation. The excluded group did not fall within 
the imperatives of this program, which required a reserve-base, experience with 
gaming and a high degree of financial and political accountability and 
identifiability. As well, this program responded to a well-articulated self-
government aspiration and interest in a commercial casino operation by bands. 
A fourth and final approach to section 15(2) discussed in this paper and 
ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Lovelace builds on the 
section 15(1) test as articulated in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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  (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 387 (C.A.). 
12
  [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566, at 591-92, 594. 




Immigration):13 The Law approach to section 15(1) was not discussed in the Court 
of Appeal decision in Lovelace since the Law decision had not yet been rendered. 
At the time the Court of Appeal rendered its decision, the Supreme Court was 
deeply divided on the analytic framework for section 15(1) of the Charter, and so it 
was not surprising that the Court of Appeal turned to the human rights 
jurisprudence.  
In Law, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the following approach for the 
determination of a violation of section 15(1):  
The approach adopted … focuses upon three central issues: 
(A) whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and others, 
in purpose or effect; 
(B) whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination are 
the basis for the differential treatment; and 
(C) whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory 
within the meaning of the equality guarantee. 14 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada further held that determining whether a program 
is “discriminatory” involves an analysis of whether the program reflects stereotypes 
or presumed characteristics which have the effect of perpetuating or promoting the 
view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition. This definition of 
discrimination is intended to promote human dignity, equal concern, consideration 
and respect.  
In order to assess discrimination, the Court suggested an analysis of four 
“contextual factors”: 
 
(1) whether the excluded group had a pre-existing disadvantage; 
(2) whether the alleged ground of discrimination corresponds to the needs, 
capacity or circumstances of the Charter applicant; 
(3) whether the purpose or effect of the program is to ameliorate the 
condition of more disadvantaged groups; and, 





  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
14  Id., at 548. 
15  For more recent applications of the Law test see M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at 45-47; 
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at 215-16; Winko v. 
British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, at 675; Delisle v. Canada 
(Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at 1022-25; and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, at 727-40. 




Although the presence of a judicial consensus in the Law case on the appropriate 
approach to section 15(1) was applauded by the legal community and the public 
more generally, the test itself can be criticized on at least three fronts. First, it has 
been suggested that this test is unduly complex. One author has suggested that 
there are 16 steps before you are in a position to obtain a response.16  
As well, the test may well be indeterminate in the result and at least easily 
manipulable. Because there is only a series of questions to ask or guidelines to 
follow in the assessment of discrimination, with no weighting system for each 
question, the answer to any constitutional challenge is difficult to predict. What if 
answers to some questions point to discrimination whereas answers to other 
questions do not? How do you decide which contextual factors prevail? 
Finally, as discussed more fully below in the analysis of the Lovelace decision 
itself, it is certainly arguable that the Court in Law has melded section 15(1) with 
parts of the traditional section 1 Charter test. In particular, by including the second 
contextual factor of merit, capacity and circumstances (also called the 
correspondence factor) within section 15(1), the Court is asking questions similar 
to those asked under section 1 of the Charter.  
In terms of the application of Law to targeted programs, a plain reading would 
suggest that many affirmative action programs could be challenged under section 
15(1). This is because such programs usually do provide for differential treatment 
based on an enumerated and analogous ground. As well, the Law decision suggests 
that exclusion from a benefit itself can be demeaning and doesn’t appreciate that 
affirmative action programs can exclude groups without necessarily diminishing 
the dignity of those groups. Furthermore, to the extent that such programs may 
target a disadvantaged group that is nevertheless more advantaged than another 
disadvantaged group, the application of the first and third contextual factors would 
suggest that such programs discriminate, in violation of section 15(1).  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISION IN 
LOVELACE 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the Casino Rama project 
and further held that the Law test was directly applicable to targeted ameliorative 
programs described by the language of section 15(2). As a result, the attributes and 
frailties of Law are now part of the affirmative action context.  
All the parties and intervenors in Lovelace took the position that the Law test 
had to be amended in some fashion to take into account section 15(2) and the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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 See Bredt & Nishisato, “The Supreme Court’s New Equality: A Critique” (Osgoode Hall Law 
School, Charter Update, Continuing Legal Education Program, 1999 Constitutional Cases Conference, 7 
April 2000). 




affirmative action context. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, was not 
willing to openly admit that the test would have to be amended for the affirmative 
action context. Instead, it opined that the Lovelace case was “an opportunity for the 
Court to confirm that the s. 15(1) scrutiny applies just as powerfully to targeted 
ameliorative programs.”17 Further, it explicitly rejected the proposition that for 
section 15(2) type programs, the section 15(1) analysis should be easier to meet 
because of the ameliorative purposes of such programs.18 Instead, it held that the 
existing test was already sufficiently well developed to deal with affirmative action 
programs without any modification. As will be discussed below, however, while 
the Court was not willing to openly admit that section 15(1) had to be modified in 
the affirmative action context, in fact, that is exactly what it did.  
On the facts of this case, the Court found that the first step of the equality rights 
test was met since there was differential treatment between the Métis and non-
status Indian communities and the Indian bands. With respect to the second step, it 
assumed, without deciding, that the differential treatment was based on an 
enumerated or analogous ground such as ethnic origin.  
Turning to the third and final step of the section 15(1) test, assessing whether 
there was discrimination, the Court found that there was no discrimination. It 
began by analyzing the first contextual factor of “pre-existing disadvantage, 
stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability” of the excluded group. Previously, this 
factor had been understood to require some sort of demonstration of relative 
disadvantage of the excluded group vis-à-vis the beneficiaries of the program. The 
Court held, however, that this was an error of interpretation. The Court opined that 
it was contrary to the spirit of equality to pit disadvantaged groups against each 
other in a determination of who is the worst off. To require proof of relative 
disadvantage would result in a “perverse competition over which [group] is more 
needy.”19
  
The extent to which the Supreme Court of Canada sought to deny that it was 
amending this first contextual factor is evident from the following passage of the 
decision: 
 
Admittedly, in Law, there are a number of observations about what result might be 
expected in relation to various constellations of relative disadvantage. However, these 
were observations and nothing more; they were present in order to convey a full 
appreciation of the flexibility of the substantive equality analysis. The broad and fully 
_______________________________________________________________ 
17  Lovelace, supra, note 1, at 988. 
18
  Id., at 1005. 
19
  Lovelace v. Ontario (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 735, at 760 (C.A.), and [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at 
981.  




contextual s. 15(1) analysis transcends the superficiality of a simple balancing of 
relative disadvantage.20 
 
While the amendment of the first contextual feature is appropriate for the 
affirmative action context, the Supreme Court of Canada fails to recognize that this 
is indeed an amendment and may well be only necessary in the context of a 
targeted section 15(2) program. In most other contexts, the first contextual factor, 
which had entailed evidence of relative disadvantage, would still be an appropriate 
consideration in determining discrimination.  
If this first contextual factor is now to be interpreted as simply asking whether the 
excluded group is disadvantaged vis-à-vis society at large, it is unlikely to carry much 
weight in the ultimate determination of discrimination in the affirmative action 
context. This is because affirmative action programs typically target a few 
disadvantaged groups and will inevitably exclude the vast majority of disadvantaged 
(and advantaged) groups. In this respect, affirmative action programs are 
distinguishable from universal programs which single out and exclude very few 
disadvantaged groups. 
The very limited weight to be attributed to this first factor in affirmative action 
contexts is demonstrated by turning to the facts of the Lovelace case itself. The 
Court concluded that the appellants were disadvantaged and stereotyped because of 
societal attitudes toward non-status and Métis aboriginal people. The Court did not 
find relative disadvantage although it did note that the excluded group could not 
receive some of the federal funding provided to Indians. This contextual factor, 
however, did not appear to have any impact on the result. Instead, the Supreme 
Court quickly moved on in the analysis to what is likely to become the only real 
issue in section 15(1) affirmative action cases, namely, whether the different merit, 
capacity or circumstance of the two groups reveals a valid rationale for the 
exclusion of the claimant.21   
In the circumstances of the Casino Rama project, the Court carefully examined 
this second contextual factor: the correspondence of the needs, capacities and 
circumstances of the excluded group with the impugned programs. It concluded 
that there were valid different circumstances between the two groups that justified 
the exclusion of the appellants. Importantly, only the bands held the land necessary 
for the casino. Furthermore, because the project involved “partnering” in a 
commercial venture with the bands, it was tailored to their circumstances and 
needs. The Court also found that because of the different history of illegal gaming 
_______________________________________________________________ 
20
  Lovelace, supra, note 1, at 986. 
21
  The Court dealt with the first contextual factor on the merits in one sentence when it stated: 
“leaving aside as I must arguments advanced relating to the potentially discriminatory or arbitrary nature 
of the exclusionary provisions of the Indian Act, the appellants have failed to establish that the First 
Nations Fund functioned by device of stereotype” (Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at 993). 




in the two groups as well as different self-government aspirations relating to 
gaming, it was appropriate for the government to start with a casino project for 
bands.  
The appellants had argued that the Métis and non-status Indians had similar 
economic and social needs as status Indians and the Casino Rama project was simply 
a device to meet those needs.22 The Court agreed that they had a similar need but 
rejected need as the fundamental basis for the finding of discrimination in this case. 
Instead, it held that the appropriate analysis was to focus on circumstances of the 
included and excluded groups.  
The analysis undertaken by the Court under this contextual factor resembles the 
purpose-based approach discussed above and applied by the Court of Appeal. This 
is because, at the end of the day, this factor is designed to answer the question of 
whether the ameliorative purposes of the program have been met in the program 
design. While the Supreme Court of Canada did not agree that it was asking a 
question similar to that asked by the Court of Appeal, it did recognize that this 
contextual factor is similar to the rational connection approach discussed in the 
previous section and adopted in the human rights jurisprudence. The Supreme Court 
concluded that “the rational connection test … matches the approach to examining the 
“correspondence factor” embedded in the s. 15(1) analysis ….”23 
In light of this explicit recognition of the relationship between the second 
contextual factor and a rational connection test, it must be asked, what is left for 
section 1 of the Charter? The Court states that by using its approach “one can 
ensure that the program is subject to the full scrutiny of the discrimination analysis, 
as well as the possibility of a s. 1 review.”24 The question that remains to be 
answered, however, is whether a meaningful section 1 review is truly available. 
On the one hand, it is arguable that the section 1 test still has a role to play since 
government priorities such as deficit reduction may very well not be sufficient to 
prevent a finding of discrimination but may be sufficient to meet a section 1 
justification.25 Further, there may be a role for section 1 if courts require a very 
precise degree of correspondence between the merits, capacities and circumstances 
and the program. On the other hand, it is also arguable that there is a limited role 
left for section 1 of the Charter because there is little difference between a 
rationality analysis and a section 1 Oakes analysis. Indeed, it could be argued that 
section 1 had set a higher threshold for the government to meet than the current 
section 15 approach. This is because under the section 1 analysis, there is the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
22  Lovelace, supra, note 21, at 994. 
23
 Id., at 1007. 
24
  Id., at 1011. 
25
  See Cameron v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S.C.A.), 
leave to appeal denied, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 531, for an example of cost reduction as a section 1 
justification. 




requirement of not just rationality but minimal impairment of the right at issue. As 
well, under section 1 the onus lies on the government, whereas under section 15 it 
lies on the claimant. As the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet explicitly 
discussed the possibility of an overlapping relationship between section 15 and 
section 1 of the Charter, it remains to be seen whether it will simply acknowledge it 
or try to amend the test so as to minimize the overlap. 
The third contextual feature in the Law case is the analysis of the ameliorative 
purpose. In Law, the Court had held that ameliorative legislation that was designed 
to benefit the population in general but which excludes a historically disadvantaged 
claimant would “rarely escape the charge of discrimination.”26 In Lovelace, 
however, the Court was required to backtrack and reject this analysis in part. Now, 
at least in the targeted program context, instead of finding that programs which 
exclude historically disadvantaged groups suggest discrim-ination, the Court will 
focus on the ameliorative effect on the included group. The result is that this factor 
in the affirmative action context will invariably suggest non-discrimination because 
such programs are inevitably ameliorative.  
What the Court did with this third contextual feature is modify it for the 
affirmative action context by removing any comparative analysis of the 
disadvantages between the excluded and included groups.27 Simply stated, the 
application of this contextual factor where the excluded group is disadvantaged in 
the non-affirmative action context is likely to lead to discrimination, whereas in the 
affirmative action context, it is not.  
The fourth and final contextual feature discussed in Lovelace was the nature of 
the interest affected. While it had been argued that the exclusion from the Casino 
Rama project demonstrated a lack of recognition of these groups as self-governing 
communities, the Court found such an assertion “remote.”28 This part of the 
decision suggests that where money is the benefit provided by government, even 
where it is a very large sum of money as was the case with the Casino Rama 
project, the nature of the interests affected are not likely to suggest discrimination. 
Simply stated, loss of pecuniary benefits are less likely to point to a section 15(1) 
violation than the loss of fundamental privacy interest or an ability to participate in 
democratic processes.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Lovelace decision has many positive aspects. It confirms the importance of 
ameliorative, targeted programs in achieving substantive equality. It permits 
_______________________________________________________________ 
26
 Lovelace, supra, note 21, at 999, quoting Law, supra, note 13, at 518, quoting Andrews v. 
Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 174-75. 
27
 Lovelace, supra, note 21, at 1000. 
28
 Id., at 1002. 




disadvantaged groups and governments to work together to build programs to 
overcome stereotyping of these groups. It acknowledges that it is not necessary to 
target the most disadvantaged group when developing an ameliorative program. As 
well, the fact that the Court decision was unanimous suggests that it is committed 
to a single vision of equality. The Casino Rama project itself will provide the 
bands and their members much needed economic support.  
Nevertheless, the question which must now be asked is whether the Court’s 
vision of equality provides sufficient guidance and clarity. How practical is the 
Law test when trying to ascertain violations of section 15(1)? Has Lovelace 
modified the Law approach to equality rights, at least in the affirmative action 
context? What is the role of section 1 in light of the Law test? In this paper, it was 
suggested that the contextual factors have changed to deal with unique features of 
targeted ameliorative programs. The result is greater judicial deference toward 
such programs and a concomitant diminution in the ability of any group, including 
disadvantaged groups, to successfully challenge these programs.  
